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Abstract 
This paper analyzes major changes in the regulation of the financial sector in Europe over the last 
three decades. Focusing on the pattern of change across five countries (Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain), the paper identifies two major periods of regulatory change: first, the shift away 
from postwar patterns of credit regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, and second, the intensification 
of state supervisory powers and the introduction of new regulatory structures from the 1990s to 
the present.  In both cases, the authors point to the way in which different models of financial 
sector regulation affect the political consequences of macro-economic policy for political elites as 
an explanation for choices that governments have made in the regulatory arena. More specifical-
ly,  while regulatory change in the first period may be largely explained by the way in which dif-
ferent postwar models of credit regulation impinged upon a government's political ability to im-
pose disinflation,  choices in favor of different regulatory structures in  the second period  (single 
regulator in Britain and Germany versus multiple regulators in the other countries) can be related 
to differences in the area of pension reform.  By focusing on the political implications that differ-
ent modes of financial regualtion can have for elected officials in the context of different macro-
economic scenarios, the  authors offer an explanation of regualtory change that differs from ac-
counts which emphasize the primacy of financial market forces in driving such change.    The liberalization of national financial systems has been one of the major regulatory de-
velopments of the last three decades across both advanced industrialized and developing coun-
tries. This regulatory trend is of the utmost importance as financial systems mediate the alloca-
tion of savings and capital in an economy and hence are central to the economic trajectory of 
nation-states. The question remains, however, as to how and why financial liberalization and 
regulatory reform take place. While liberalization and regulatory reform are almost always 
couched in the language of market efficiency, purported economic benefits do not of themselves 
provide an adequate explanation for regulatory change. For such change to occur, there must be 
actors with specific objectives and with the political capacity to bring about change. Under-
standing the motivations that guide such actors is critical in understanding the shape that regu-
latory reform takes. Yet, on this question of the “politics” of regulatory reform the political 
economy literature has offered few consistent answers. While most authors emphasize the driv-
ing role of world financial markets in forcing recalcitrant governments to abandon traditional 
modes of financial market regulation, others emphasize the leading role of state officials in ad-
vancing national objectives and the persistent impact of institutional differences in the structure 
of national financial systems.  
 
   In this article, we seek to further our understanding of regulatory change by highlight-
ing the ways in which the regulation of national financial systems is linked to features of the 
domestic political economy, and specifically to the calculations of elected officials with respect 
to the politics of macro-economic policies. To understand the complexity of recent regulatory 
trends across countries we must move beyond the question of whether reform is state- or 
market-led, and whether it is institutionally constrained. We must look at the manner in which 
the regulation of finance institutions and flows affects the political cost of different forms of 
macro-economic adjustment and at how different choices in the area of macro-economic policy 
affect the political salience of financial market regulation.  
 
   The empirical basis for our argument is provided by a comparison of the patterns of re-
form over the last three decades across five European states (Britain, France, Germany, Spain, 
and Italy). These cases represent the largest economies in the EU as well as a range of different 
regulatory starting points. The course of regulatory reform in these five cases has been marked 
by cross-national similarities and differences that vary from one period (the 191970s and 1980s) 
to another (the 1990s and on) and that cannot simply be attributed to international market pres-
sures or varying institutional starting points. Indeed, the course of reforms takes turns that 
seem paradoxical from either a market-driven or a standard institutionalist perspective. One 
such aspect is the relative timing of reform efforts. The first countries to undertake major over-
hauls of their postwar modes of financial sector regulation (in the 1970s and mid-1980s) were 
Britain (with the most market-based financial system) and France and Spain (the most interven-
tionist), whereas in Germany and Italy (with a private-bank-organized and a state-controlled fi-
nancial system, respectively) there were no major overhauls until the 1990s. On the other hand, 
Britain and Germany (the cases commonly viewed as starting with the most market-based and 
the most organized financial systems respectively) have seen the most dramatic change in regu-
latory structures in recent years with the consolidation of autonomous regulatory agencies into 
single regulatory bodies that are accountable to the political executive, whereas France, Spain, 
and Italy have retained multiple, autonomous regulators with differentiated functions and an 
important regulatory role for their central banks. 
 
  1   We are able to relate many of the differences and similarities in this complex cross-
national pattern of regulatory reform to three variables: 1) macro-economic policy choices in-
volving significant distributive consequences and hence potential political costs for elected au-
thorities, 2) the way in which particular modes of financial system regulation affect the trans-
parency of those macro-economic choices (and hence the ability of voters to establish political 
accountability) and 3) the way in which macro-economic choices by governments, in turn, affect 
the political salience of financial system regulation. More specifically, we find that early moves 
to abandon established modes of financial regulation in the 1970s and 1980s occurred in those 
countries (Britain, France, and Spain) where political elites had opted in favor of cheap-credit 
driven growth strategies in the early postwar period. They did not occur, in spite of rising inter-
national financial integration, where governments had opted for export-led growth models pre-
mised on price stability in that period (Italy and Germany). On the other hand, the move to cre-
ate powerful, politically accountable single regulators has occurred where, due to fiscal policy 
considerations, governments have made a decisive political bet on promoting private pensions 
(Britain and recently Germany) as part of welfare reform. They have not occurred in the other 
three cases, where private pensions have not played a prominent role in welfare reform, and 
where central banks were well positioned to retain a regulatory role. All this leads us to con-
clude that the political calculations of elected state elites regarding the effects of macroeconomic 
choices play a more important role in explaining the course of financial regulation than is com-
monly recognized. 
 
  The cross-national variation we observe in the timing of reforms and in their institution-
al outcomes points to the way in which financial regulation is linked to broader questions of po-
litical transparency and accountability in market economies. We suggest that, because of the fi-
nancial system’s role in mediating the allocation of savings to all other sectors of the economy 
and its unique role in mediating key government policies, the politics of regulatory reform of 
the sector cannot be captured from a strictly sectoral perspective such as might be appropriate 
in analyzing trade policies or even the regulation of public utilities. The regulation of financial 
institutions is subject to particular regulatory problems that are inescapably linked to the char-
acter of macroeconomic policy. The sector acts as the principal conduit of monetary policy, so 
that the consequences of that policy are experienced by citizens and businesses through the ac-
tions of financial institutions (in particular banks). Different models of financial market regula-
tion render monetary policy decisions – and the manner in which they affect different segments 
of the population – more or less politically transparent, increasing or reducing the political costs 
of such decisions. On the other hand, the sector’s role in allocating the savings of individuals 
renders it the principal alternative to public provision of income to non-working citizens (in 
particular pensioners). This links financial sector regulation to questions of political accountabil-
ity for welfare provision and the regulation of risk in market societies. Thus, for example, de-
cisions in the area of fiscal policy, in particular efforts to shift the burden of old-age pensions 
from state pension systems to the private sphere, tend to raise the political salience of financial 
sector crises and with it, that of the supervision of the financial system. 
  
While we propose a view that pays greater attention to the relationship that financial 
regulation holds to the politics of macro-economic policy in order to explain differences in the 
course of regulatory reform, we also note important general trends in this relationship that lead 
us to distinguish three main periods in the course of regulatory reforms: 1) an initial period last-
ing from the era of postwar reconstruction to the late 1960s, in which the internal and external 
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turn, produced major differences in financial regulation; 2) a period lasting from the collapse of 
Bretton Woods through the 1980s, in which the principal challenge confronting governments 
was that of fighting inflation, leading some governments, but not all, to seek to alter their regu-
latory regimes, and 3) a period starting in the early 1990s when the problem of inflation had 
largely subsided and changes in the composition of domestic savings markets, resulting from 
pension reform and privatization, has created new incentives for political elites to intensify state 
supervision of the financial system. 
 
The overarching point that we seek to illustrate is how important the politics of macro- 
economic policy has been in determining the regulation of finance. Our argument is one of path 
dependence, in the sense that early macro-economic policy choices in the postwar period led 
political authorities to opt for different regulatory regime for finance which, in turn, produced 
different incentives for regulatory reform in the second period. And fiscal policy changes in the 
1980s and early 1990s produced new pressures for further regulatory reform in the 1990s. More 
specifically, we find that in countries where governments in the immediate postwar period 
opted for growth models based on cheap credit (as was the case in Britain, France, and Spain), 
postwar financial regulation took a shape that highlighted the distributive impact of economic 
adjustment measures once the cheap credit growth strategies had to be abandoned. In these 
countries, the turn to a less accommodating monetary policy following the oil shocks of the 
1970s led, in fairly short order, to major regulatory changes, starting with the deregulation of 
credit followed by early initiatives to boost the role of capital markets. By contrast, in the two 
cases where political elites in the postwar period had opted for growth strategies that were pre-
mised on price stability (Germany and Italy), the frameworks of regulation created after the war 
were left largely unaltered until other pressures (most notably the creation of a single European 
market in financial services) took effect in the 1990s. We suggest that this is because financial 
sector regulation, though quite different in character in the two countries, nevertheless took a 
form that did not seem to politicize economic adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other 
hand, we also find that the second major change in financial regulation, namely, the decision by 
governments to intensify the supervisory role of the state over their financial systems in the 
1990s, can be linked to prior fiscal policy choices, and in particular to efforts by governments to 
achieve fiscal consolidation via the privatization of state assets and of old age pensions, which 
have had the unintended effect of raising the question of political accountability for market fail-
ures and, with it, the salience of financial regulation.  
 
   In the following two sections we lay out the principal regulatory divides, between the 
first and second periods and between the second and third periods, and seek to explain the 
cross-national patterns that we see in each case. Lastly, we seek to explain differences in the 
way in which governments have sought to reorganize their regulatory institutions in the most 
recent period by looking at changes in the structure of domestic savings markets and at the way 
in which the role of central banks, which had developed as the default regulators of the finan-
cial system in previous periods, have been affected in the last round of regulatory change.  
 
I. Postwar models of financial regulation and the first wave of regulatory reform 
 
  Two kinds of themes have dominated the study of financial systems by political econo-
mists over the last half century. In the 1970s and 1980s the primary focus was on the impact that 
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ized world. The work of Andrew Shonfield, John Zysman, Peter Hall, and David Soskice among 
others suggested that differences in national financial systems gave countries different com-
parative advantages and led them to pursue different postwar economic strategies. Such differ-
ences in financial systems continue to be highlighted in the contemporary literature on varieties 
of capitalism, which has tended to emphasize the persistence of institutional differences in fi-
nancial systems and their impact on firm strategies (see chapters by Hanke and Vitols in Hall 
and Soskice 2001). Since the late 1980s, however, many authors have argued that growing in-
tegration of international financial markets would erode differences in financial systems as gov-
ernments were forced to converge towards a liberal regulatory regime that was friendly to-
wards holders of financial assets who now had greater exit options (see, for instance, Frieden 
and Rogowski, 1996). Regulatory reforms carried out under the banner of financial “liberaliza-
tion” over the last two decades are often cited as evidence for the latter view, whereas persisting 
differences are cited by proponents of the former. 
 
   If we turn to the five economies under consideration, however, we find that neither the 
thesis of institutional persistence nor the thesis of market-driven convergence toward the 
Anglo-Saxon model advanced by the globalization school fit particularly well with the trends in 
financial regulation we observe across these countries. We find rather that the dynamics of fi-
nancial regulation differed substantially between countries in ways not explained by institu-
tional legacies per se or international market forces alone, and that the driving factors behind 
stability and change in financial institutions changed significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s.  
 
  In the two decades following the end of World War II, the regulation and characteristics 
of national financial markets took different forms across Western Europe. In spite of common 
challenges of postwar reconstruction and an international currency regime that allowed for in-
tensified integration of product markets, national financial systems remained closed to the ex-
ternal world and political authorities chose to regulate their domestic systems in significantly 
different ways. The clearest difference involved the manner in which the financing of non-
financial firms was addressed, including 1) the contrast between the British model of financial 
regulation based on the separation of commercial and merchant banks, in which corporate fi-
nance was left largely to capital market issuance organized by the latter, and the commercial 
bank-based systems of corporate finance in Continental Europe and 2) among the latter, the 
contrast between the German model, in which corporate finance was organized by private and 
local, semi-public, universal banks and the French model of selective credit regulation that al-
lowed the state to direct the allocation of financial resources in the economy (see Zysman 1983 
Hall 1986, Loriaux 1991). These differences in national regulatory regimes were seen to lie be-
hind important differences in postwar economic strategies and outcomes including the French 
effort to shift resources from low productivity agriculture to high productivity industry, Ger-
many´s capital and technology intensive strategy of export led growth, and Britain´s failure at 
industrial policy (Zysman 1983).  
 
  The two-way typology distinguishing between market- and bank-based systems on the 
one hand, and state interventionist versus non-interventionist models of corporate finance on 
the other, is often thought to capture the emergence of historical types that followed from a 
combination of the timing of industrialization and prior institutional legacies to produce dis-
tinct institutional logics in the course of development. One can cite here the arguments regard-
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to early industrialization), the role of universal banks in German industrial development (again 
linked by Gerschenkron to late industrialization), and the legacies of Colbertism in France em-
phasized by Andrew Shonfield and others. Yet as we move beyond the British, French and Ger-
man cases we find that a purely institutional explanation for postwar regulatory modes does 
not seem to hold. Thus, in Spain, where the banking system that emerged at the turn of the cen-
tury was characterized by private universal banks with heavy industrial stakes, political au-
thorities under the Franco regime nonetheless imposed a regime of selective credit regulation 
linked to indicative planning that closely resembled that developed in France. And in Italy, 
where the state had largely nationalized the banking system in the 1920s, postwar governments 
never developed the systematic regulation of credit linked to indicative planning that we see in 
France and Spain. Instead, postwar Italian governments came to rely on their control of the Isti-
tuto per la Recostruzione Industriale (IRI) banks to exercise direct political discretion in the alloca-
tion of credits, limited, however, to only a portion of the market (Perez 1998). On the other 
hand, in Britain, usually distinguished by the market-based character of its corporate finance 
system, the activities of the commercial banking system (clearing banks engaged in deposit tak-
ing and consumer lending) were subject to an extensive regime of state controls during the post-
war period, including direct regulation of the Bank rate, direct quantitative controls of bank ad-
vances and credit flows (Cameron 2004).1  
 
  The approaches taken by political authorities toward the allocation of the financial sec-
tor’s resources thus involved different forms of state interventionism and of reliance on private 
actors that cannot be captured simply in a “state versus market” dichotomy. We find it more 
useful therefore to distinguish three types of credit regimes among our five countries: 1) a pri-
vate bank organized system, with only a limited role for the state in the direction of credit (as in 
Germany); 2) a system of comprehensive credit and interest rate controls (either selective as in 
France and Spain, or more general as in Britain); and 3) a segmented system in which political 
authorities exercised control over a portion of the credit market through nationalized credit in-
stitutions, without imposing any comprehensive regulation of the credit market (the case in It-
aly). The key distinction that sets our analysis apart from the state versus market typology here 
is that between the latter two models. We refer to the first of these (Britain, France and Spain) as 
a “soft but comprehensive” form of interventionism, and the latter (Italy) a “hard but limited” 
form of state control over credit.  
 
  The postwar picture of divergence in regard to credit regulation just painted began to 
change in the early 1970s, when governments in three of our five cases (Britain, Spain and 
France) undertook major regulatory transformations. In Britain, direct credit controls were dis-
mantled in 1971 in favor of “competition and credit controls” (the lifting of quantitative controls 
and the replacement of the regulated Bank Rate by a minimum lending rates and reserve ratios 
deposited with the Bank of England). This first attempt at liberalization failed when secondary 
banks used the opportunity to engage in a short-term borrowing and generated a lending 
boom, leading to the imposition of new direct controls via the requirement of supplementary 
special deposits by banks with the BoE (the so-called Corset). But it was followed by a second, 
                                                 
1In this particular sense, the postwar British regime for the commercial banking sector came closer to the 
comprehensive regulation of credit markets that we see in France and Spain, than it does to the less com-
prehensively regulated credit regimes in Germany and Italy.  
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the reform of the securities markets – the so-called “Big Bang” – (see Moran 1991). In the case of 
Spain, the system of selective credit rediscounting was transformed into a system of compul-
sory credit coefficients in 1971 that were subsequently dismantled after the Spanish transition to 
democracy, bringing state-directed credit allocation to an end (Perez 1997). This was accompa-
nied by a major reform of the stock market in the second half of the 1980s. In France, selective 
rediscounting was similarly replaced by a system of selective credit ceilings in the 1970s, and 
these were subsequently abolished under the first Socialist government of the 1980s at the same 
time as credit markets were overhauled to allow for a major rise in securities-based corporate fi-
nance over the following decades (see Loriaux 1991 and Cerny 1989). In all three countries, 
these changes were accompanied by the attribution of new supervisory powers over the bank-
ing sector to the national central bank and by introduction of new institutions to regulate securi-
ties markets.  
 
  In contrast to this radical pace of change in the principles guiding financial regulation in 
Britain, France and Spain, the regulation of finance in Germany and Italy experienced a remark-
able degree of stability during the 1970s and 1980s. In neither country did governments intro-
duce any fundamental changes in credit regulation, and reforms of other markets, in particular 
the stock markets, remained very modest. No major alteration of the principles governing cor-
porate finance occurred. In the case of Germany, the reform of the securities markets was lim-
ited to changes in the way in which the stock markets were managed so as to lessen the influ-
ence of the smaller regional exchanges. But universal banks kept their central role in the market 
(Lütz 1998). In Italy, the government retained its political control over a substantial segment of 
the credit market through its continued control of the IRI, and there were no significant reforms 
to the regime of credit regulation or other elements of the financial system (see Deeg and Perez 
2000) 
 
  This contrast between intense regulatory change in Britain, France and Spain, on the one 
hand, and continuity in Germany and Italy, is striking, in particular as the character of financial 
systems within each of these groups was very disparate. The financial system of Great Britain, 
defined by the division between deposit and merchant banks and the prominent role of securi-
ties markets, was quite different from that of France and Spain, with their state-directed credit 
systems and limited capital markets. The same can be said about the private-bank-organized 
financial system of West Germany and the state-dominated banking system that persisted in It-
aly. There is thus little clear order to the cross-national pattern we observe in this period if we 
look at it in terms of the traditional distinction between state and market, or bank- and security 
based-, systems. How then can we account for the pattern?  
 
The prevalent view of the regulatory reforms of this period emphasizes the lack of via-
bility of credit controls in a world of rising cross-border capital flows and the availability of new 
exit options for financial investors who could seek better returns in places that produced more 
allocative efficiency and hence higher returns (for example Goodman and Pauly, 1993). And in-
deed, the reform efforts of all three of the countries that undertook credit deregulation in the 
1970s and 1980s were couched in the language of market efficiency, seeming to lend support to 
the view that pressure from financial market actors was the main causal mechanism behind 
regulatory reform. Yet if reform was driven principally by the threat of regulation-evading capi-
tal flight, we would expect greater regulatory change in those countries with the less liberalized 
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tems. This does not seem to be borne out by our cases. Table 1 shows an index of financial liber-
alization constructed by Abiad and Mody (2003) ranging from 0 (defined as full repression of fi-
nancial transactions) to 18 (defined as full liberalization). The index is based on several meas-
ures, including credit controls (including selective regulation of credits depending on the recipi-
ents and reserve requirements), interest rate controls (including floors and ceilings), barriers to 
entry in the banking sector, securities markets regulations, the degree of privatization in the fi-
nancial sector, and restrictions on international financial transactions. It suggests that among 
four of our five cases (the index is not available for Spain), Germany and Britain had the most 
liberalized financial systems in the early 1970s, and France and Italy the least liberalized. 
France’s relatively early move to overhaul its financial system and Germany’s lack of regulatory 
reform from the 1970s through the mid 1980s might have been accounted for by the fact that 
France started out with a highly “repressed” financial system – and hence, presumably would 
have faced a greater market pressures – and Germany with a far less “repressed” one (and 
hence, presumably, would have faced less pressure). Yet the argument falls apart when we 
move to the other cases. Thus, it is unclear why Britain, with one of the least “repressed” sys-
tems, would have been pushed to undertaken a major regulatory overhaul in the 1970s, while 
Italy, with one of the most repressed systems and a higher reliance on foreign capital than any 
of the other countries, was not.  
 
Table 1 
 
Financial Liberalization Index 
(0 = Full Repression; 18 = Full Liberalization) 
  1973  1980  1987 
Germany  16  16  16 
Britain  12  15  18 
France  5  5  13 
Italy  5  6  6 
Based on Abiad and Mody (2003), p. 86 
 
  There are further reasons why the market-driven view of financial liberalization does 
not provide an adequate explanation for the cross-national pattern that we observe in the 1970s 
and 1980s. There are two causal mechanisms whereby the emergence of international financial 
markets might induce politicians to opt for financial market deregulation. The first is by shifting 
the preferences of domestic financial market actors leading to political pressures for liberaliza-
tion. The second is by creating new exit options for investors resulting in capital outflows and 
the threat of full-fledged capital flight. If new international market opportunities were the catal-
yst for reform, we should see evidence for at least one of the two mechanisms at work in our 
cases. That is to say, we should find evidence for at least one of the following empirical impli-
cations. If a shift in the preferences of domestic market actors was behind reform, we should 
find that liberalization was actively promoted by members of the financial sector. If the threat of 
capital flight induced credit deregulation, we should find that external capital controls were be-
coming so ineffective as to undermine attempts to regulate credit selectively.  
 
None of the three cases in which credit deregulation took place offers evidence of either 
type of causal mechanism. Concerning the first mechanism, the principal agents behind the 
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tween the timing of the reforms and political pressure from the kinds of sectoral actors sug-
gested in market-driven explanations of reform. Indeed the most strongly affected sectoral ac-
tors – large commercial banks – adamantly opposed the reforms at the time of their initiation in 
Spain, and had serious apprehensions about them in France (Loriaux 1991, Perez 1997). Nor did 
foreign banks play a significant role. Indeed, they were actively discriminated against in the 
course of the reforms in Spain. Only in Britain can one argue that sectoral actors – in this case, 
international merchant banks – actively favored reform. Yet this only applies to the reform of 
the stock market. As far as the prior step of credit deregulation was concerned, the principal ac-
tors – i.e., clearing banks – opposed the move in 1972 and 1979 (Westrup 2005).  
 
There is also little evidence for the second type of causal mechanism whereby market 
pressures might have forced reforms. If the growth of international financial markets had 
undermined the viability of external capital controls, producing capital outflows to the point of 
compelling domestic credit deregulation, we would expect such credit deregulation to have 
been followed – in relatively short order – by the dismantling of external controls. Yet in France 
and Spain external capital controls were not dismantled until the very end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, and then only in compliance with new EC directives. The notion that ex-
ternal capital controls could no longer be sustained is also contradicted by the substantial inter-
est rate differentials between offshore and domestic interest rates that persisted in the European 
Exange Rate Mechanism (ERM) until the end of the 1980s (which suggest that capital controls re-
mained quite effective in shielding weak currency economies [de Grauwe 1990]) and by the 
huge rise in cross-border flows that followed after controls were dismantled in 1989 (Artus and 
Bourguinat 1994). Moreover, it is entirely unclear why Italy, which was more dependent on for-
eign capital than Britain, France or Spain, would see no major changes to its system of financial 
regulation until the mid-1990s, when its state-controlled banks were privatized. Indeed, the con-
nection between internal reforms and external liberalization seems to have been the opposite of 
what the market-driven view suggests: the dismantling of external controls was part of a broad 
effort by governments such as the French to capitalize at the EU level on domestic reforms that 
had been initiated a good deal earlier for another set of reasons.  
 
Yet if the early turn towards regulatory reform was neither compelled by capital flight 
nor the result of political pressure from market actors, what explains the early decision of public 
officials in favor of credit liberalization in Britain, France and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s and 
the absence of major regulatory changes in Italy and Germany during this period? We propose 
that that the explanation for this cross-national pattern lies in political considerations by public 
officials that had less to do with market pressures than with the relationship that financial regu-
lation held to macro-economic policy in each country. More specifically, the move to abandon 
credit controls of various sorts in Britain, France and Spain was driven in the first instance by 
the political difficulties that credit controls in those countries created for elected governments 
when those governments set out to fight inflation. 
 
One thing that the British regulatory regime of overall credit ceilings and quantitative 
credit controls shared with the interventionist modes of selective credit regulation in France and 
Spain – and that sets these three cases apart from both the private-bank-based German system 
and the state-controlled banking system in Italy – was the fact that credit policy incorporated 
the instruments of monetary policy. In France and Spain, selective credit regulation, consisting 
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of reconciling the preference of governments for a loose credit policy with the imperatives of 
currency convertibility. (It allowed authorities to gain some measure of control over monetary 
expansion without hurting credit to those sectors that they sought to favor at those times when 
currencies came under external pressure and without moving to a more orthodox monetary pol-
icy regime.) Similarly, in Britain, quantitative credit controls were instituted as an instrument 
that allowed for ad hoc adjustments in monetary policy when Britain´s generally accommodat-
ing monetary policy stance threatened the value of the pound. By contrast, the German and 
Italian modes of financial regulation, however different from each other, were developed in the 
context of export-led growth strategies premised on price stability that led early elites to place 
the main instruments of monetary policy in the hands of autonomous, or functionally autono-
mous monetary authorities. Hence Italian political elites resorted to their direct political control 
over state-owned banks rather than to any comprehensive scheme to regulate credit, while 
German political elites limited their reach over credit markets to circumscribed export credit 
schemes, leaving overall credit regulation in the hands of the autonomous Bundesbank.2  
 
It is this central – yet much overlooked – relationship between modes of credit regula-
tion and macro-economic strategies (summarized in Table 2) that offers an explanation for the 
cross-national pattern of financial reform that we see in the period leading up to the 1990s. For, 
if credit controls were introduced in Britain, France and Spain to make viable an accommodat-
ing monetary stance, that same regulatory framework turned into a serious political liability 
once the supply shocks of the 1970s forced elected authorities to turn to the problem of inflation.  
 
Table 2 
 
  Regulatory Outcome 
Macroeconomic- Growth 
Strategy 
Non-statist/ 
PrivateBank 
Organized 
Selective and/or 
Comprehensive Credit 
Controls  
Direct Political 
Control  
 
Cheap Credit-Driven/ 
Subordinated Monetary 
Policy 
 
  
France, Spain , 
Britain 
 
 
Export-Oriented/Price-
stability premised 
 
Germany  
  
Italy 
 
As long as the general tenor of credit policy remained accommodating, credit controls 
consisted primarily of the selective rediscounting (i.e. selective expansion) of credit by the cen-
tral banks in France and Spain, and of punctuated restrictions in the British case. With the 
                                                 
2This feature of postwar regimes of financial regulation can be linked to early choices made by political 
elites regarding how to deal with inflated currency pools left over from wartime (Perez 1998). In both 
Germany and Italy, postwar authorities opted for radical currency reforms that set the stage for export-
led growth strategies predicated on price stability. In France, Spain and Britain, by contrast, financial 
regulation was shaped by the decision against radical monetary stabilization in the 1940s.  
  9 problem of stagflation, however, the principal problem for monetary policy became that of stop-
ping wage-price spirals, and thus of highly explicit and lasting credit restrictions. Thus, the shift 
in regulation that we see in France and Spain is that from selective rediscounting to selective re-
strictions, via ceilings (in France), compulsory coefficients (in Spain), and, in the British case, to-
ward a much more intensive use of quantitative controls following the failure of Competition 
and Credit Control (CCC) in 1973.3 In none of the three countries were governments able to sus-
tain a consistent disinflation process by these means. Thus, the second round of change in each 
country was to abandon credit controls in favor of a model in which monetary policy was car-
ried out in a routine fashion by national central banks operating in newly created money and 
public debt markets.   
 
  The principal reasons for this early embrace of financial liberalization in the three coun-
tries were political rather than imposed by economic actors. Although central bankers advance 
a number of technical arguments for why monetary control is better achieved through indirect 
central bank operations than through direct credit controls – including the bluntness of controls in 
addressing short-term liquidity fluctuations and the incentives they create for financial innovation 
aimed at evading regulation – all three governments were relatively successful at imposing mone-
tary rigor through quantitative controls at those points in time when they chose to abide by their 
targets. In the late 1970s, the French government, for example, came just as close to meeting its 
monetary targets by way of its system of credit ceilings as did the German Bundesbank, which 
relied on central bank operations (OECD 1983, 1984: 30). Thus, if explicit controls over credit lim-
ited the capacity of public officials to fight inflation, they did so primarily because they raised the 
political profile, and hence the political costs for governments, of measures to impose monetary 
rigor. While controls were in effect, governments were continually under pressure to expand ex-
emptions marked for specific users of credit (see Loariaux 1991, Perez 1997). By contrast, when 
credit growth is controlled by a central bank through routine operations in a money market, 
monetary rigor is politically easier because it leaves the allocation of hardship to the presumed 
neutrality of the market.  
 
  These political considerations constituted an important incentive for elected authorities to 
embrace the arguments of advocates of liberalization at particular points in time. It fits the differ-
ing timing with which the commitment to abandon credit controls regulation was made. Thus, in 
Spain, the fundamental package of measures was pushed through in the throes of the political re-
gime transition (1977), when authorities faced the dual tasks of thwarting an explosion in wages 
while simultaneously initiating a democratic process of policymaking. In France the decision to 
abandon selective credit regulation was made only after 1983, when elected authorities (Mitter-
rand) decided that austerity would be unavoidable. In Britain, it was only after the political fallout 
of attempts to impose disinflation through quantitative controls had materialized that those con-
trols were abandoned and that the Bank of England was given effective control over money mar-
kets as part of the 1979 Banking Act.4 
 
  This political explanation of why credit controls were ended also fits the relative absence 
of institutional changes in Germany and Italy during this period. While Italy’s financial system 
                                                 
3The adoption of CCC in 1971 involved the move from an administratively set Bank Rate to a Minimum 
Lending Rate. It resulted in a dramatic explosion of credit and a rapid rise in inflation over 1972 and 1973.  
4An earlier attempt to lift all controls in the early 1970s failed as it was not backed by the necessary meas-
ures to allow the Bank of England effective control over money markets. 
  10 remained markedly statist (given the political control of the IRI and the Bank of Italy’s use of ad-
ministrative controls) and Germany’s was not, neither country’s regime of credit regulation in-
terfered with the overall tenor of monetary policy. In Germany that policy had been in the hands 
of an independent central bank since the 1950s. And in Italy, the Bank of Italy had long exercised 
de facto control over monetary policy, even while it was formally subordinated to the Treasury 
and had a legal obligation to monetize Treasury shortfalls until 1981. Thus the political dynamic 
whereby credit regulation raised the political salience of unpopular monetary policy measures 
did not ensue, and political authorities faced fewer incentives to initiate an overhaul of the system 
of financial regulation  
 
  Seen in this light, the cross-national pattern of regulatory reform in the 1970s and 1980s 
was intimately linked to the differing roles that monetary expansion had played in postwar eco-
nomic strategies, and to the way in which those strategies had affected the design of postwar 
regulatory regimes for credit. It was that relationship to the politics of macro-economic policy, 
rather than pressures on governments stemming from international markets, which provided 
the common motivation for political elites in Britain, France and Spain to embark on the first 
wave of credit deregulation. The decision to boost the role of capital markets followed from this 
first phase of regulatory reform. And although capital market reform was, in turn, subject to a 
different set of political considerations, the point here is that it occurred first in those countries 
where governments had been led to embark on a course of regulatory reform by the political 
costs that their postwar framework of credit regulation imposed on them in an era of stagfla-
tion.       
 
II. The second wave of regulatory reforms  
 
  While in the 1970s and 1980s the principal events in the area of financial regulation in-
volved the abandonment of credit controls followed by the overhauling of stock markets, the 
1990s have been a period in which financial reform has been dominated by efforts to strengthen 
the supervision of the financial sector by public authorities. From a cross-national perspective, 
the principal outcomes to be noted during this period are, first, an-across-the board intensifica-
tion of the supervision of different elements of the financial system (banking, securities, insur-
ance) by public authorities that has manifested itself in an increase in legislation concerning 
standards of governance, new regulatory institutions and, generally speaking, an increased role 
for the state in these matters; and, second, divergence in the institutional models whereby this 
new, intensified supervisory role of the state is being applied. Britain and Germany have opted 
for a single financial regulator, while France, Italy and Spain have maintained a functional sepa-
ration between banking, securities and insurance regulators. A particularly noteworthy and, we 
consider, crucial aspect of this contrast in institutional responses concerns the role of the central 
banks. In the British case, the Bank of England no longer has any role in regulation, and in Ger-
many, the Bundesbank has been rejected in its attempts to expand its regulatory role beyond a 
broadly implementationary one, whereas in our other three cases, the respective central banks 
have maintained their roles as prudential regulators of banking institutions.  
 
In this section, we explore some reasons why state actors’ interest in market supervision 
has increased, and why we see different institutional responses. We argue that, aside from the 
external pressures highlighted by other authors, the salience of prudential regulation and the 
supervisory role of the state have increased because of changes in the composition of domestic 
  11 savings markets. As in the case of postwar regulatory regimes and the earlier turn towards 
credit deregulation, there is a link between the new regulatory turn and macro-economic policy 
choices: the changes in savings markets that we point to are largely the result of efforts by gov-
ernments to attain fiscal consolidation by way of the privatization of state assets and the promo-
tion of private pensions as part of welfare reform. On the other hand, in understanding the di-
vergence in institutional responses, we point to the emergence of a split in this period between 
two types of state actors, namely the governments and central banks, which had operated most-
ly as allies in the previous period of regulatory reform. This split, we suggest, has taken on par-
ticular salience in the cases of Britain and Germany.  
 
Regulatory Reform in the 1990s  
 
  In the previous section we described the main differences in postwar financial regimes 
among our five European cases in the key area of credit regulation and its relationship to mone-
tary policy. By contrast to this divergence in credit regulation, one characteristic of postwar fi-
nancial regulation that was similar across all cases was the low intensity, if not absence, of regu-
lation of a supervisory nature; that is, regulation aimed at the character of competition, business 
conduct and prudential standards in the financial sector. In the three cases where the banking 
system remained predominantly in private hands after the war (Britain, Germany and Spain) 
there was a heavy reliance on self-regulation by the sector in regard to all these matters. Indeed, 
commercial banks were cartelized in Britain and Spain, somewhat less so in Germany.5 Securi-
ties markets in all five of our cases were also characterized by the absence of public supervision 
and by a limited degree of competition among market agents.6  
 
In Britain neither the state nor the Bank of England had legislative powers to supervise 
banking institutions until the Banking Act of 1979, which established the BoE´s supervisory role 
over banking.7 It was not until 1986 that the Securities and Investment Board was created to 
oversee the securities market, and it was created as what Moran describes as a mesocorporatist 
body with regulatory responsibility shared between state and market actors (Moran 1991).  
 
  In Spain, banking regulation was the purview of a High Banking Council presided over 
by the head of the Treasury, but controlled by the seven largest commercial banks which, like 
the British case, operated as a cartel and were the principal players in the stock market (Perez 
1997). In Germany, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (BaKred), a government agen-
cy created in 1961 to supervise the banking system (the strongest example of an effort at public 
supervision of private banks), nonetheless shared with the Bundesbank a philosophy of mini-
mum intervention and limited its role to establishing a general framework of rules through 
close consultation with the banking sector, rendering the regime highly corporatist in nature 
(Busch, 2000; Coleman 1996).  
                                                 
5In the latter case, the semi-public, local savings banks served to insure more competitive conditions in 
the market for corporate finance for smaller firms (Deeg, 1999)). 
6Not surprisingly, in all four of the bank-based countries, capital markets retained a very narrow charac-
ter as corporate finance was dominated by bank credit, although this had not always been the case. The 
French stock market, for instance, had played quite an important role in the 1920s, yet was decimated by 
the state-implemented policy of cheap credit after World War II. 
7Clearing banks operated openly as a banking cartel within the context of state credit controls (Budd, 
2002). 
  12 In the 1990s, by contrast, we see the emergence of new supervisory institutions that 
bring to an end the norm of self-regulation. Most dramatic in this regard has been the concen-
tration of regulatory functions under a new overarching institution (the Financial Services Au-
thority) by the Labour government in Britain, ending both self-regulation in the securities mar-
kets and the regulatory role of the Bank of England (Westrup 2007). A similar, if differently or-
ganized, concentration of regulatory functions was established in Germany in 2002, with the 
creation of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstlistungaufsicht (BaFin), which now covers the 
functions of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAWe), the securities regulator 
created in 1996), BaKred (the institution overseeing prudential standards in the banking sector 
since 1961), and Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen (BaV), the insurance regul-
ator.8 
 
  In the other three countries, while new institutions were introduced and supervisory 
powers intensified, we see the continuation of a multiplicity of regulatory agencies with respon-
sibility for supervision of the financial system. In France, a new securities regulator (the Conseil 
des Marchés Financiers (CMF) was created in 1997 and later merged with the Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse (COB) to form L'Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) in 2003. However, 
the Commission Bancaire still regulates the banking sector and the French Insurance Supervi-
sory Authority continues to regulate the insurance sector. In Italy, the Bank of Italy’s supervi-
sory powers over financial intermediaries were strengthened in 1993 and so were the powers of 
Italy‘s securities regulator, the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) in 
1998. Yet the central bank has retained its oversight of the banking sector. Finally in Spain, as in 
France, adjustments have been made to financial regulation in accordance with the EU’s In-
vestment Services Directive (ISD), but regulation remains split three ways between the Bank of 
Spain (banking), CNMV (markets) and Directorate of Pension and Insurance Funds (DGS).  
 
This turn in the course of financial regulation presents us with two questions. The first is 
the question of why state actors across the board have sought to intensify the supervision of the 
financial sector in the last decade whereas they had continued to rely on self-regulation even as 
liberalization and stock-market reform took place during the 1980s. The second is why govern-
ments are opting for different institutional structures in their efforts to enforce such supervision.  
 
Turning to the first question, the focus on prudential regulation and market supervision 
in the last decade is often attributed to a particular set of external forces: 1) “financial globaliza-
tion” (Strange 1996, Held et al 1999), which has led states to look to international organizations, 
such as the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and the International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions (IOSCO), and international agreements such as Basel 1 and 11, as a means of 
imposing standards and of monitoring compliance in the context of open financial markets 
(Simmons 2001, Pauly 2002); 2) a process of Americanization which is attributed to the influence 
of American financial institutions and investors in world markets (Moran 1991, Laurence 2001); 
and 3) Europeanization by way of EU directives such as the Banking directives which mandate 
capital standards similar to those agreed to in the Basel accords and also the Investment Ser-
vices Directive. 
 
  It is undeniable that all three features of the external context listed have influenced regu-
latory reforms during the 1990s. However, they cannot explain the abandonment of the prin-
                                                 
8The Bundesbank still carries out the on-site regulation of banking institutions. 
  13 ciple of self-regulation and the increase in state oversight. Neither the capital adequacy guide-
lines of the BIS or European directives, nor Americanization, required the creation of agencies 
accountable to the executive such as have been introduced in Britain and Germany.  
 
  There is, however, another development that can serve to explain why governments 
would be motivated to seek an intensification of state supervision, namely the significant 
changes we see in domestic savings markets over the last two decades.  
 
Table 3. Composition of household assets (in % of gross financial assets) 
 
    1980 1990  2000 
Britain 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain** 
Deposits 
Risk Assets 
Bonds 
Equities 
Institutions 
 
Deposits 
Risk Assets 
Bonds 
Equities 
Institutions 
 
Deposits 
Risk Assets 
Bonds 
Equities 
Institutions 
 
Deposits 
Risk Assets 
Bonds 
Equities 
Institutions 
 
 
Deposits 
Risk Assets 
 
Bonds 
Equities 
Institutions 
43 
53 
7 
12 
30 
 
59 
33 
12 
4 
17 
 
59 
30 
9 
12 
9 
 
58 
24 
8 
10 
6 
 
 
66 
21 
 
5 
14 
2 
31 
61 
1 
12 
48 
 
48 
44 
16 
7 
21 
 
38 
56 
4 
26 
26 
 
35 
48 
19 
21 
8 
 
 
62 
 
 
7 
26 
18 
22 
74 
1 
17 
56 
 
34 
60 
10 
16 
34 
 
25 
61 
2 
37 
23 
 
25 
75 
19 
26 
30 
 
 
36 
64 
 
2 
34 
28 
Source: Davis (2003), *OECD-OEE/Pioneer Investment Research 2001 and Cuentas Financieras de la Eco-
nomia Española (1982-1991), Madrid: Bank of Spain, 1992.  
** Figures shown for Spain in the 1980 column are for 1982, the first year data is available.  
 
  14   As Table 3 shows, there was in all five of our countries a marked shift in the structure of 
household savings, away from secure assets such as bank deposits (which constituted the prin-
cipal savings vehicle for households in 1980) toward risk assets (including most notably hold-
ings of equity and investments placed in securities markets through institutional investors). Be-
tween 1980 and 2000, the total proportion of risk assets (which also include bonds) rose from 53 
to 74 percent of household savings in Britain, from 33 to 60 percent in Germany, 30 to 61 percent 
in France, 24 to 75 percent in Italy, and 21 to 64 percent in Spain. Among risk assets, we also see 
a marked decline in the proportion held in bonds (the least risky of “risk assets“) in favor of 
riskier investments in all countries but Italy, which, on the other hand, has seen the single most 
dramatic change in the allocation of household savings.9  
 
The shift in the structure of household financial assets from bank deposits to risk assets 
has important political implications for elected authorities. The vulnerability of large segments 
of the electorate to market events has dramatically raised the political salience of financial 
supervision, raising the costs for political authorities of supervisory failures. That new political 
risk becomes all the more significant as authorities beyond Britain consider moves to shift the 
weight of old-age income provision from public to private pensions. Prior to the 1990s, bank de-
posits dominated the portfolios of most households in all five of our countries, and prudential 
regulation was of interest almost exclusively to technocrats, predominately central bankers and 
senior civil servants, but not to elected officials. The primary reason for the lack of interest by 
elected authorities was the low political cost of regulatory failure, since, in the event of a bank-
ing failure, central banks could carry out a traditional lender-of-last-resort function, bringing in 
other domestic banks to assist if necessary. The rise in the role of investment funds, pension 
funds and individual stock ownership, however, has raised the potential political cost of regu-
latory failures for elected officials, increasingly putting them at odds with technocratic elites, 
particularly central banks, to whom they had previously delegated control of such regulation. 
This has created new incentives for governments to seek to intensify state supervision of finan-
cial markets and, in some cases, to reassert their control over them by centralizing financial 
regulation in a single regulatory agency accountable to the political executive (as has been done 
in Britain, and more recently in Germany). 
 
One example of this new political salience of financial supervision was the pension mis-
selling scandal of the 1990s in Britain, which followed the Thatcher government’s policy of en-
couraging private pensions through fiscal incentives, leading some seven million people to opt 
out of both SERPS (State Earnings Retirement Pension Scheme) and occupational schemes in fa-
vor of personal pensions, before it emerged that people were persuaded to opt out of schemes 
against their best interests (Institute of Fiscal Studies 2000). The scandal proved to be highly po-
litically controversial and expensive for large financial institutions (which were forced to reim-
burse some 1.6 million people at a cost of ₤11.5 billion, and it prompted an immediate review of 
the regulatory system [FSA 2001]). Another example is the 1993 failure of Banesto in Spain, 
which affected as many as 300,000 small shareholders, and played into the Socialist electoral de-
feat of 1996. Yet another prominent example is that of Parmalat in Italy. Though Italy is one of 
the countries that has not drastically altered its supervisory institutions, the scandal was largely 
blamed on the supervisory failure of the Bank of Italy and Consob, which share responsibility 
                                                 
9 It is also noteworthy that Italy has long had the most developed of corporate bond markets which offer a greater 
risk and return than government bonds.  
  15 for bond markets, and it led Finance Minister Tremonti to call for a major overhaul of those in-
stitutions in favor of a new, overarching regulatory agency (Financial Times 2004). The fact that 
this call was not heeded is one of the questions we will take up in the next section.  
 
What the change in the structure of savings has done is to bring to the fore the question 
of political accountability for market failures, raising what was once the “low” politics of finan-
cial sector regulation to a new status of “high” politics. This provides us with an explanation for 
why governments across the board have chosen to increase state supervision of the financial 
sector even when external actors, in particular international investors and international financial 
institutions, have not demanded such change. Such an explanation is also more compatible with 
the variation in institutional models that we see governments opting for, as it does not depend 
on the notion of an external enforcement mechanism to account for regulatory change. On the 
other hand, it does not explain that pattern of variation in institutional responses. We will turn 
to this question in the next section.  
 
Before doing so, however, we must point out that the change in the structure of domes-
tic savings markets that has occurred is itself the consequence of policy choices in the area of fis-
cal policy and welfare reform. Although stock market reforms have been guided at least in part 
by the goal of attracting investment in a context of globally mobile capital, this facilitated, but 
did not itself produce, the shift in the allocation of household savings. Two other forces were far 
more important in this regard. First, the mass privatization of large public enterprises, in par-
ticular public utilities, which offered new investment possibilities to small investors, starting 
with Britain (British Telecom, British Gas, BP, BA and British Steel, France (Suez, Société Géné-
rale, and Compagnie Générale d’Electricité), Spain (Telefónica, Repsol, and Endesa), Germany 
(Veba, Deutsche Telekom) and Italy (Mediobanca). Secondly, the expansion of share ownership 
across Europe has been strongly encouraged by important tax incentives offered by govern-
ments to encourage long-term savings among households (a move usually connected to welfare 
and in particular pension reform).10 Examples include tax relief for direct and indirect equity 
ownership in Britain via the introduction of Personal Equity Plans in 1987 and that of U.S.-style 
Individual Savings Accounts in 1999, tax relief for life insurance and the Riesterrente in Ger-
many, “voluntary wage savings partnership plans” introduced by the French Socialists in 2001, 
and tax relief for mutual fund and private pension investments in Spain (see Institute for Fiscal 
Studies 2000; Davis and Steil 2001; Clark 2003). The rise in direct and indirect risk asset holdings 
of private households, and hence the political pressure to increase state supervision over the 
financial system, thus have been foremost the result of policy choices made in response to the 
fiscal pressures on national budgets and pension systems.  
 
Central Banks and Regulatory Models 
 
  The rise in the domestic political salience of financial regulation offers an explanation for 
the turn towards increased state supervision that is, at the same time, more compatible with the 
finding of different institutional responses than explanations that attribute regulatory reform to 
                                                 
10Although the ideological objective of spreading popular capitalism was a factor in some of these cam-
paigns (notably the Thatcher government), the process was dominated by fiscal policy considerations (fis-
cal consolidation and reducing the burden on public pensions) in virtually all cases. There is evidence 
that this is true even in the British case (Lawson 1991).  
 
  16 external market forces. This is because a process driven by domestic political considerations 
leaves more room for the influence of other factors in determining institutional responses than 
one driven by a common set of external market forces. To understand the different institutional 
responses, we propose to look at how the increased political costs associated with financial mar-
ket failures has altered the relationship between two actors whose interests tended to dovetail 
in the previous decades: elected governments and central bankers. The latter have typically 
played the role of default regulators over the financial system, and tended to act in unison with 
elected authorities when it came to questions of credit regulation and justifying anti-inflationary 
policies. Yet the changes described above in the composition of domestic savings markets set 
things up for a potential rift in the interests of these two state actors. This is particularly the 
case, we will suggest, where governments are putting their weight behind efforts to boost the 
role of funded private pensions, as in Britain and Germany.  
 
  Before moving on to consider the likely reasons for the different institutional models 
adopted in EU countries in recent years, it will help to review these differences and to consider 
the main normative arguments offered by economists in explaining these models of financial 
supervision. As already noted, the main difference we observe among our five cases is that be-
tween the choice in favor of a single regulatory agency that oversees all sectors of the financial 
system and is accountable to the political executive (Britain and Germany), and the option of re-
taining different regulators for different segments of the financial system, and in particular, the 
authority of autonomous central bankers over the banking system (France, Spain,and Italy).  
 
In Britain and Germany, with the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and 
the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), all sectors are now under the su-
pervision of a single regulator accountable to the political executive. Although the internal or-
ganization of the two agencies differs in that regulatory responsibilities within the BaFin are still 
largely divided on functional grounds whereas the FSA has a more fully centralized structure, 
they have one important commonality, namely, that they are accountable to the political execu-
tive. In this regard they differ fundamentally from the norm in the other three countries, which 
not only maintain different regulators for different segments of the financial system, but these 
regulatory agencies (central banks, insurance and securities regulators) also have the status of 
autonomous governmental bodies that are specifically shielded from interference by elected 
authorities. As Moran points out, the FSA “has a radically different relationship with the central 
state from that enjoyed by the old institutions of City regulations and the Bank of England. The 
Treasury appoints its Board, it reports annually to the Treasury and the House of Commons, 
and is required to give evidence to the Treasury Select Committee” (Moran 2003). In the case of 
BaFin, there is also a clear change in the accountability structure. The new institution is control-
led by an administrative council comprised of twenty-one members, including four from the Fi-
nance ministry (including the chair), one from the Economics and Labor ministry, one from the 
Justice ministry, five from the Bundestag and ten from the financial services industry. The chair 
of BaFin reports regularly to the Bundestag finance committee. And even though the old regula-
tory agencies survive under the oversight of the BaFin, the latter has already proved its regula-
tory muscle in issues such as the negotiation of the German position at the Basel II discussions, 
the decision to begin to implement risk appraisals of banks’ lending portfolios, and the delicate 
  17 negotiations about the solvency ratios of German insurance companies.11 As with the FSA, the 
creation of BaFin has proven that German political authorities want a financial regulator that is 
powerful but also accountable to the democratic process. 
 
As Table 4 indicates, this regulatory trend goes beyond just the five countries under con-
sideration here, with several other states in Europe also moving to the single regulator model. 
Others, however, have retained either a two or a three regulator model, maintaining the institu-
tional separation along functional lines of banking, securities and insurance. In Italy, we ob-
serve relatively little institutional change that has not been inspired directly by EU directives of 
prudential supervision. Such was the case with the Consolidated Banking Law of 1993 which 
gave the Banca d’Italia (BdI) extended supervisory powers, followed by the 1998 Consolidated 
Law on Finance, which both strengthened securities regulation and transferred specific respon-
sibility for conduct of business from the BdI to Consob. Significantly, the BdI has retained con-
trol of the prudential regulation of not only banks but also security firms and the very impor-
tant bond market, this in spite of a number of major scandals involving the BdI. (The BdI also 
retains a key role in deciding upon appropriate levels of competition, which has proven signifi-
cant in so far as it has prevented foreign takeovers of Italian banks). In France, as in Spain, it is 
only the securities markets that have seen significant institutional change among French regula-
tory institutions since the banking and stock exchange reforms of the eighties. First in 1996, the 
Conseil des Marchés Financiers (CMF) was created to oversee the regulation of markets, partly 
as a response to the EU Investment Services Directive. The CMF was then merged with the COB 
in 2003 to create the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). The AMF has the full powers of a se-
curities regulator and has been given a legal personality distinct from the state, unlike France’s 
other administrative authorities (AMF 2003). The Banque de France still retains the lead in bank-
ing regulation through its oversight of the Commission Bancaire. 
 
Table 4 : Financial Regulatory Models (EU 15) 
 
Single Regulator  Two Regulators  Three Regulators 
Denmark (1988) 
Sweden (1991) 
Britain (1997) 
Germany (2002) 
Austria (2002) 
Ireland (2003) 
Belgium (2004) 
Netherlands (2004) 
Luxembourg (1998) 
Finland (1993) 
 
 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
Source: Davies 2004 
 
Economists and policy experts offer several arguments for why the institutional struc-
ture of financial regulation should change in favor of a single regulator. First, with “financial 
globalization,” the lines between types of financial institutions and the products they sell have 
become increasingly blurred over time. (An example is the rise in “bancassurance,” or the merg-
ing of banks and insurance companies to reflect the increasing similarity of certain banking and 
insurance products and the involvement of banks in securities trading and fund management.) 
 
                                                 
11Jochen Sanio as chairman has a high political profile and all the important private actors involved in 
German financial regulation appear to take it seriously (IMF 2003). 
  18  It is argued that a single regulator is better able to understand the total risk profile of a 
financial institution in these situations (Davies 2004, Padoa Schioppa 2004). A second set of ar-
guments involves the identity of the regulatory agency – specifically the positioning of central 
banks. As savings and capital markets were predominately bank-based in the pre-reform pe-
riod, it was central banks that emerged as the most powerful regulatory agents in most Euro-
pean countries as self-regulatory bodies were abolished. Yet leaving financial regulation in the 
hands of central banks as capital markets expand presents the risks of extending them outside 
their traditional area of expertise and of regulatory overload. In addition, because central banks 
have traditionally acted as lenders of last resort, there is a risk of increased “moral hazard” 
when such a safety net is extended to other types of institutions (Goodhart 2002). Thirdly, the 
problem of allowing the central bank to become a “super-regulator” is compounded by the de-
cisions of governments to grant these institutions statutory autonomy in order to depoliticize 
monetary policy and reduce inflationary expectations (Cukierman 1992). When the regulatory 
mandate of central banks is extended to new areas of financial sector regulation, there is a con-
centration of regulatory power and a lack of political accountability in an area where such a 
condition has not necessarily been justified.  
 
On the other hand, there are also arguments in favor of an alternative, “Twin Peaks” op-
tion of two regulators. This alternative allows for a division in responsibility between two key 
objectives of supervision, the promotion of systemic stability and customer protection, and pre-
serves the benefits conferred by the expertise of central banks as prudential regulators looking 
out for the stability of the financial system (Goodhart 2002) (Padoa-Schioppa 2004).  
 
These theoretical arguments have mostly been mustered in the debate over whether or 
not the EU should create a separate, EU-wide supervisory authority to match the centralization 
of monetary policy functions in the ECB (Padoa-Schioppa 2004), a move for which there are few 
prospects as long as the national regulatory models remain as relatively diverse as Table 2 indi-
cates. They do not of themselves, however, offer much traction in explaining the pattern of di-
versity that we see. The types of problems spelled out in the policy debate apply equally to the 
cases we consider. And there is little evidence that the prevalence of any particular theoretical 
viewpoint determined the choice of regulatory structure in the five countries.  
 
Nonetheless, the policy debate on the benefits of different institutional arrangements 
does offer an important clue as to the politics behind the diverse institutional responses in dif-
ferent European countries by focusing our attention on the role of central banks. One way to 
look at these diverging results is that the choice between introducing a single, politically ac-
countable regulator or maintaining the traditional division of labor among regulatory agencies 
in practice centers on the question of whether or not to subordinate the central banks (as noted, 
traditionally the most powerful regulator) to a new, overarching and politically accountable 
agency. The new political salience of financial regulation can pit elected government officials 
against autonomous central bankers. It can lead elected authorities, who are held accountable 
for financial market failures, to seek control over supervision, while central bankers, who had 
gained powers from such measures as credit deregulation and the initial expansion of supervi-
sory regulation, seek to maintain their regulatory authority. This latent conflict is likely to be 
particularly acute in the EU, where central banks have ceded their monetary policy authority 
upward to the ECB, so that their domestic role now centers exclusively on their regulatory pow-
ers (Davies 2004). In this context, other factors that affect the position of strength of central 
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outcomes.  
 
In both the British and German cases, the creation of single regulatory agencies involved 
an important struggle with domestic central bankers. In the case of Britain, the New Labour 
government’s decision to create a new single regulatory agency to supervise the entire range of 
the financial services industry, including banking, was greeted with major surprise because, al-
though the party had committed itself in its manifesto to reform of the Securities and Invest-
ments Board, the decision to strip the Bank of England of its regulatory powers was completely 
unexpected.12 The decision was greeted with fury by the Governor of the Bank of England, who 
apparently considered resignation (Keegan 2003). Yet, the continued high-profile failures of the 
previous regulatory regime (including the pensions mis-selling scandal and the BCCI scandal) 
weakened the political capability of both the BofE and key private actors such as the banks and 
the insurance companies to argue against the case for the FSA. Indeed, it is significant to notice 
how muted the reaction of private actors was to the government’s decision. Given the high-
profile regulatory failures of the Bank in the past, it was unthinkable to consider placing it in 
charge of an expanded supervisory agency. Thus the decision was either to create a new single 
regulator or to follow a Twin Peaks model and create a new prudential regulator to oversee all 
financial institutions, including the banks. In the end, the Treasury decided that the radical op-
tion was more appropriate, and neither the Bank nor its traditional clients were in a position to 
block it. In summary, the decision to create the FSA was an explicitly political one by the govern-
ment with the clear objective of stating that financial regulation was too important, both politi-
cally and economically, to be determined by either an independent Central Bank or any degree 
of self-regulation (See Westrup 2007 for a full discussion).  
 
In Germany, the rationale for, and path to, a comprehensive regulatory agency was 
somewhat different. Nonetheless, a key feature of the German government’s decision to design 
the new BaFin was that it had to overcome the opposition of the Bundesbank, which up to that 
point had been a key member of the “Frankfurt coalition” responsible for the regulatory re-
forms of the early nineties, including the creation of the BaWe. (Luetz 1998, Coleman 1996). For 
the Bundesbank, it was not just a case of relinquishing responsibility for regulation but of seek-
ing to increase it. During 1999 and 2000, it lobbied aggressively to increase its regulatory remit 
as it sought to find a new role following the ceding of monetary policy to the ECB. First, it ar-
gued that it should assume responsibility for all financial regulation and then, when the Finance 
ministry dismissed that suggestion, modified its proposed role to that of assuming responsibil-
ity for banking regulation by integrating the BaKred into the Bundesbank, in a manner analo-
gous to the relationship between the Commission Bancaire and the Bank of France (Engelen 
2001). The Länder (i.e., states) governments and the public sector banks broadly supported the 
Bundesbank in this position. However, the other components of the Frankfurt coalition, in par-
ticular the private banks and the Finance Ministry (under Hans Eichel), supported the creation 
of a single regulatory authority. In the end, it came down to an unexpected last-minute decision 
by Schroeder to side with those other members of the Frankfurt coalition, creating a major sur-
prise with Eichel’s January 2001 announcement. What may well have tipped the scale in the end 
was the fact that the decision on the new regulatory structure came to coincide with the govern-
                                                 
12The Economist described the change as “astonishing and “a dramatic new plan for financial regulation.” 
The Economist, May 24, 1997, p. 15. 
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by allowing German citizens to place part of their contributions in private accounts (the so-
called the Riester Renten). That move was one in which the Schroeder government faced strong 
opposition (Busemeyer 2005; Hering 2004). And according to one 2001 article put out by the 
Deutsche Bank, “The increased significance of private retirement provision going forward … 
[was] ... a major factor dictating the need for a change in supervisory structure” (Speyer, 2001). 
 
Yet, if the increased vulnerability of citizens to market events and of political authorities 
to supervisory failures led British and German authorities to create new regulatory structures, 
why do we not see a similar set of decisions to replace the supervisory powers of the central 
banks with new, politically accountable regulators in the other three countries? This is particu-
larly striking as these countries too have seen their share of financial scandals that might be at-
tributed to supervisory failures in recent years (Credit Lyonnais, Vivendi, Banesto, and Parma-
lat).    
 
One explanation that we can offer is that in all three of these countries, central banks 
were far better placed to defend their turf as a result of their central roles in acting as overseers 
of their country’s participation in EMU. This seems to be particularly true in the Spanish and 
Italian cases, where the central banks attained a good deal of political capital over the previous 
decade, as both countries embarked on major efforts to meet the Maastricht convergence crite-
ria. The statutory independence of these institutions is thus more easily cast in terms of auton-
omy from political corruption than as a lack of political accountability. The leading position of 
Spanish central bank reformers in defining economic policies in the post-Franco era has been 
amply documented (see Perez 1997). And in the Italian case, the perception of the Bank of Italy 
as an institution with unique credibility (at least until the Fazio affair) is manifested in the fact 
that two senior central bank officials (Ciampi and Dini) were appointed as prime ministers to 
oversee the government’s campaigns to regain credibility both domestically and internationally 
in the face of the profound political crisis of the early nineties (Sbragia 2001).13 
 
 The French case is somewhat more difficult to explain. Yet here too it can be argued that 
the central bank has played a rather particular role. The decision not to subordinate this regu-
latory authority of the Bank of France to a politically accountable regulator may be the result of 
the BdF’s particular role among French economic and political institutions. Traditionally, the 
Bank had relatively little independence from the Treasury and was part of the statist structure 
of the French state (Hall 1986). However, with the adoption of the franc fort policy in the mid-
1980s the Bank became identified with France’s ambition to create a strong role in the future of 
European monetary and exchange rate policy through EMU. Once it obtained its independence 
                                                 
13Nonetheless, there is increasing evidence of a split in the view of state actors in Italy following the Par-
malat affair, which affected some 85,000 bond holders. In the aftermath of the scandal, finance minister 
Tremonti proposed the dramatic step of creating a “ super authority” that would replace Consob and take 
regulatory powers away from the Bank of Italy, which held primary responsibility for the supervision of 
the bond market (Financial Times 2004), a proposal fiercely opposed by the Governor of the Bank. Al-
though Tremonti subsequently resigned, and the Bank’s supervisory role has continued, what is apparent 
is that the interests of state actors in Italian financial regulation are now more diverse than they were a 
decade ago.  
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cial affairs.  
 
Lastly, we would like to suggest a second factor that plays on the side of the motivation 
of governments to promote a single regulatory authority (rather than the ability of central banks 
to oppose such a move), namely, the relative weight attributed to private pensions in the pro-
cess of pension reform across the five countries. While Britain stands apart in this regard from 
our other cases with its highly developed private and funded occupational pension schemes, it 
can be argued that the German government (under Schroeder) has taken a more decisive step to 
promote such pensions than governments have so far in Italy, France or Spain, with the intro-
duction of the Riesterrente in 2001. Although the weight of private pensions in Germany does 
not come close to what we see in Britain, the move to reduce the income replacement rate of 
public pensions by allowing German citizens to place part of their contributions in private pen-
sions constituted a watershed in German welfare reform that was carried out by the Schroeder 
government in 2001 against strong opposition (Hering 2004). With the exception of Britain, none 
of our other cases have seen a similarly decisive and politically salient move in favor of private 
pensions as a means to cut labor costs and ease the future fiscal cost of welfare provision. This 
has so far mitigated the pressure that governments face in these other countries to make finan-
cial regulators politically accountable. We would expect that any future moves to boost the role 
of private pensions (and thereby privatize the risk of old age pension provision) in these other 
countries would also increase the political salience of financial regulation and, therewith, politi-
cal pressure to move in the direction of a unified and politically accountable regulator.  
  
III. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that, to a significant extent, the variation in the patterns of 
financial de-regulation and re-regulation across our five European cases over the last three dec-
ades has been a function of the way in which different postwar financial systems relate to the 
broader politics of macro-economic policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was those states which had 
developed systems of credit regulation that tended to subsume the instruments of monetary 
policy that were the first to engage in major changes in their modes of financial regulation. We 
have suggested that this was not just because of the technical obstacles that these particular 
forms of postwar regulation posed in the face of increased capital mobility. Far more centrally, 
it was because those systems tended to politicize attempts to control inflation, injecting state au-
thorities into tough allocative choices (who would get credit and at what rate) thereby raising 
the political costs of disinflation. Regulatory regimes that did not have this particular character-
istic, whether market-oriented or state-dominated, experienced far less change in this period. 
 
In the 1990s, by contrast, regulatory reform centered on the intensification of state super-
vision over corporate governance and conduct of business in the financial sector. This we attri-
bute to changes in the composition of domestic savings markets that were encouraged by fiscal 
policies aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and at shifting the burden of old age pen-
sion provision from the welfare state to individuals. The unintended effect of these policies has 
been to increase the political costs to elected authorities of financial market failures, and hence 
the political salience of financial regulation, creating new incentives for governments to seek to 
increase the state’s supervisory role. Nonetheless, as in the first period of regulatory change, we 
see path dependence in the manner in which states have sought to address these challenges. 
  22 The increased political salience of financial market failures (calling for greater state supervision) 
was  not only  the consequence of earlier government policy choices. In those states (Spain, 
France and Italy) in which central banks played a role of leadership in the previous decade of 
regulatory reform, governments have preserved the supervisory role of these autonomous in-
stitutions. In Germany and Britain, by contrast, the central bank has been stripped of its super-
visory role through the creation of new regulatory institutions that are either directly or indi-
rectly accountable to elected authorities. This divergence in institutional responses presents a 
significant obstacle to the creation of a EU-level structure of financial sector regulation.  
 
Our attention to the role of macro-economic choices and to the political calculations of 
elected elites has important implications for our understanding of the process of financial regu-
lation. To the extent that these factors play a role in any process of reform, they may work in a 
different direction than a process driven by the efficiency-oriented dynamics postulated in 
views of reform as market-driven. Regulatory solutions that limit the political exposure of 
elected leaders may trump those that represent “best practice” from the standpoint of efficient 
capital markets. On the other hand, we note that the liberalizing and market-oriented reforms of 
the 1980s have, to some extent, had unintended consequences for political leaders. Our analysis 
hence suggests that we need to pay a great deal of attention to the way in which macro-
economic reforms that expose a wider share of the electorate to market events raise questions of 
political accountability, and how this in turn affects the regulatory choices of governments.  
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